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Abstract
This article aims to verify whether, and to what extent, the Inter‐Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic
Coordination and Governance (IPC SECG) has become an accountability enhancing arena through which domestic legis‐
latures can better scrutinize the process of the European Semester. While there is a broad scholarship on the difficult insti‐
tutionalization of the IPC SECG and controversies related to its operation, little has been said about its actual performance
as an accountability enhancing platform, especially in the context of domestic interactions between parliaments and exec‐
utives in the area of economic governance. Despite it being operational for several years, the scholarship lacks focus on the
national parliaments’ perspective with regard to this Conference’s effectiveness. Against this background, drawing from
comparative data obtained from questionnaires and interviews, this article addresses the above‐mentioned aspects from
an actor‐oriented approach and delves deeper into parliamentary perceptions of the SECG Conference. Findings indicate
that attendance at the SECG Conference by MPs has neither significantly affected their domestic parliamentary activity
in the area of economic governance and budgetary policy, nor improved the existing domestic legislative‐executive rela‐
tionship in this context. The Conference’s procedural weaknesses are only one part of the problem, another being the
marginalized domestic position of parliaments in the European Semester procedure.
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1. Introduction
The emergence of a series of measures designed to
tighten fiscal governance and national budgeting rules
across EU Member States as a result of the economic
and financial crises of 2008–2012 has undermined
to some extent (Fasone, 2015), the basic powers of
national parliaments—their prerogative to control the
domestic budgetary process and to represent their con‐
stituents’ interests during the coordination of economic
policies (Crum, 2018; Jancic, 2017; Maatsch & Cooper,
2017). As explained in the Introduction to this issue
(Woźniakowski et al., 2021), one example of such a mea‐
sure is the procedure of the European Semester in which
Member States adjust their budgetary and economic
policies to the objectives and principles established at
the EU level. Although the Semester has not formally
limited the budgetary powers of national parliaments,
it has done so indirectly. First, the specific sequencing
of the procedure has put pressure on national exec‐
utives to deliver fast‐track responses which has lim‐
ited the time available for a genuine parliamentary
debate. Second, the decision‐making formula involving
the exchange of a series of recommendations, guide‐
lines, and reports between the Commission, the Council,
and the Member States has made it difficult to locate
the political source of responsibility for specific decisions.
Third, the Commission has been given the opportunity
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to sanction Member States more easily: If national gov‐
ernments fail to comply with Commission’s fiscal recom‐
mendations, it may impose a financial penalty on them.
According to the procedure of reverse qualified majority,
the penalty imposed on a state is automatically accepted
unless the EU Council rejects it by a majority vote.
Such state of affairs raises questions of democratic
accountability of the EU economic governance in light
of national parliaments retaining responsibility for adopt‐
ing national budgets, setting taxation policies, and deter‐
mining socio‐economic priorities. In this context, the
creation in 2013 of the Interparliamentary Conference
on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance
(IPC SECG) was supposed to strengthen parliamentary
oversight in a field increasingly dominated by inter‐
governmentalism (Lupo & Griglio, 2018) and to reduce
(at least to some extent) the information‐ and control‐
related asymmetries that have emerged, on the one
hand, between governments directly participating in EU
policy‐making and MPs at home (cf. Kreilinger, 2018),
and, on the other, between the European Parliament
(EP) and the EU executive. In this vein, the setting‐
up of IPC SECG, legally prompted by Article 13 of the
Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance, can
be therefore viewed as a sort of compensation for the
objective loss of parliamentary control over the swiftly
Europeanized area of economic and fiscal governance:
principally as a platform for monitoring the European
Semester (cf. Lupo & Griglio, 2018, p. 364).
Yet, literature to date reveals a mixed picture as to
this IPC’s capacity to enhance oversight and account‐
ability of EU economic governance. Already in 2016,
Fromage expressed skepticism as to its long‐term effec‐
tiveness as a place to ensure democratic accountabil‐
ity, pointing to the varying levels of attendance, ques‐
tions of euro ins’ and outs’ membership as well as the
competitive relationship between national parliaments
and the EP. From a comparative perspective, Cooper
(2019, p. 147) has argued that out of the three IPCs func‐
tioning in the EU realm—i.e., COSAC, IPC for Common
Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security
and Defense Policy (CFSP‐CSDP), and IPC SECG—the lat‐
ter is actually the weakest in terms of its capacity to act
as an oversight body. In a more optimistic tone, however,
Kreilinger (2018, p. 274) has held that:
If assessed by the objective set in its Rules of
Procedure, according to which the IPC SECG “shall
provide a framework for debate and exchange of
information and best practices” and “contribute to
ensuring democratic accountability in the area of eco‐
nomic governance and budgetary policy in the EU,
particularly in the EMU” then the Conference actually
does what it is supposed to do.
At the same time, Lupo and Griglio (2018, p. 369)
have proposed conceptualizing the IPC SECG as “an
instrumental dimension that could help… the EP and
national parliaments to strengthen their oversight capac‐
ity, in their respective sphere of action” and postu‐
lated that this Conference “should be brought back to
traditional circuits of democratic accountability, respec‐
tively linking the European executive, as a whole, to
the EP and each national government to its national
parliament’’ (p. 367).
Against this background, this article’s goal is to con‐
tribute to the debate on whether the IPC SECG has
indeed become an accountability enhancing arena in EU
economic governance and budgetary policies by focus‐
ing on the domestic oversight dimension. By applying
the ‘dual’—as opposed to ‘joint’—scrutiny logic to study
the IPCs (Cooper, 2019, pp. 145–146), this article probes
whether, after over five years of operational experience
(i.e., after adopting its Rules of Procedure), this IPC
does in fact enhance the capacity of domestic legisla‐
tures to better scrutinize and control their executives
in the process of the European Semester. By doing so,
it casts light on whether IPC SECG attendance by MPs
has had any impact on the existing domestic legislative‐
executive relationship. Since the literature to date lacks
focus on national parliaments’ perspectivewith regard to
this IPC’s purpose and effectiveness, this research offers
an actor‐oriented approach and delves deeper into the
parliamentary experience, perceptions, and motivations
behind attending this forum. This is achieved by draw‐
ing from original data obtained through interviews, ques‐
tionnaires, and institutional documents.
This article is structured as follows: Based on existing
literature and documents review, the next section lays
down the analytical underpinnings of the undertaken
query, problematizes the connection between inter‐
parliamentary cooperation and democratic accountabil‐
ity in the case of the IPC SECG and presents the research
expectations. The two following sections verify empir‐
ically how national parliaments perceive and evaluate
this IPC. Section 3 presents findings related to parliamen‐
tary perceptions of the IPC SECG from a cross‐country
questionnaire. Section 4 provides a more in‐depth, com‐
parative case study of the IPC SECG‐related experience
of the French and Polish parliaments—thus offering
a more nuanced perspective of a Euro and non‐Euro
area country.
2. The Problematic Purpose of the IPC SECG in the
Context of Inter‐Parliamentary Cooperation
Some scholars identify inter‐parliamentary cooperation
as a potential remedy to the weaknesses of demo‐
cratic accountability in the EU, arguing that it can be an
added value in strengthening parliamentary scrutiny of
EU affairs (Wouters & Raube, 2012). In this perspective,
inter‐parliamentary cooperation has been described as
a “weapon of the weak” (Crum & Fossum, 2013) vis‐
à‐vis executive actors and a kind of a “ ‘third way’
for democratic participation and legitimacy within the
Union” between, on the one hand, the increase of the
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powers of the EP and, on the other, the direct inclu‐
sion of national parliaments in the EU policy‐making
(Manzella, 2012, p.38). Inter‐parliamentary cooperation
has also become a component of theoretical conceptu‐
alizations capturing the EU‐oriented transnational activ‐
ity of national parliaments such as the “multi‐level parlia‐
mentary field” (Crum & Fossum, 2009, p. 249) or, more
recently, the “multi‐arena playing field” (Auel &Neuhold,
2017, p. 1551). The latter views parliaments as ‘multi‐
arena players’ able to take on multiple roles and repre‐
sent citizens at different fora, as well as those beyond
the domestic realm. The novelty of this concept lies in
the notion of ‘playerness’—as a metaphor of agency—
which equips national parliaments with the capability to
exert influence over the course of the European game
(cf. Borońska‐Hryniewiecka, 2020).
The problematic nature of IPCs as a component of
‘multi‐arena playing field’ lies in the fact that contrary
to arenas such as scrutiny of national governments, the
Early WarningMechanism for subsidiarity control, or the
Political Dialogue with the European Commission, IPCs
do not provide an explicit channel of influence on, or
control over, the EU policy‐making process but rather
serve as platforms of dialogue and information exchange
(see, for an overview, Fasone & Lupo, 2016). It is through
these parliamentary activities—rather than their direct
impact—that IPCs endow parliaments with additional
resources to exert influence over EU affairs. In this sense,
Cooper (2016, 2017) argues that IPCs such as COSAC or
the IPC CFSP‐CSDP allow legislatures to better perform
their control functions vis‐à‐vis EU institutions, as well as
national governments’ conduct of EU affairs. Other schol‐
ars also agree that IPCs’ leverage lies in strengthening the
capacity of parliaments to fulfil their oversight function
over the executives, thus improving the democratic legit‐
imacy of the EU (Wouters & Raube, 2012). Another prob‐
lematic issue is whether IPCs (should) have a legitimate
role in the direct control of the EU executive, thus acting
as collective ‘oversight bodies’ together with the EP, or
whether they (should) rather enhance individual capaci‐
ties of the participating legislatures to hold their respec‐
tive executives accountable (cf. Cooper, 2019). In this
respect, Fromage (2018, pp. 14–15) observes that:
Although IPCs should not serve to hold the
Commission or any other body to account, they
perform their function more modestly, by allowing
for the exchange of information and best practices
among parliaments which national parliaments and
the EP will, in turn, be able to use individually in their
domestic scrutiny exercise.
Certain novelty in this context was an introduction in
2017 of a new type of IPC, namely the Joint Parlia‐
mentary Scrutiny Group of Europol which—unlike the
other two Conferences—has been endowed with a for‐
mal mandate to exercise joint scrutiny of an EU agency
(for more on this see Cooper, 2018).
Parliamentary expectations regarding the purpose of
the IPC SECG were already contradictory at the stage of
its institutionalization. While the French and Lithuanian
parliaments proposed that the IPC should exercise an
oversight function with respect to EU economic and fis‐
cal policy, the German Bundestag and EP envisaged it as
a mere discussion forum, possibly enabling national par‐
liaments to scrutinize one another’s economic and bud‐
getary plans (Cooper, 2016). The final version of the SECG
IPC Rules of Procedure agreed in Luxembourg in 2015
represents some sort of compromise between these con‐
trasting positions by stating that the body:
Shall provide a framework for debate and exchange
of information and best practices in implementing
the provisions of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination,
and Governance in order to strengthen cooperation
between national parliaments and the EP and con‐
tribute to ensuring democratic accountability in the
area of economic governance and budgetary policy
in the EU. (German Bundestag, 2015)
From a formal point of view, it is therefore nei‐
ther a strictly supervisory body nor a mere discussion
forum. Yet, unlike in the case of COSAC or the IPC
CFSP‐CSDP, this IPC’s formal standing explicitly refers
to the accountability relationship (cf. Fromage, 2018).
Moreover, in a broader institutional framework, the
Regulation 1175/2011 forming part of the so‐called
Six‐Pack, which complements the IPC‐related provision
of Art. 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and
Governance, states that national parliaments “should be
duly involved in the European Semester—in the prepa‐
ration of stability and convergence programs as well as
national reform programs (NRP)—in order to increase
the transparency and ownership of, and accountabil‐
ity for, the decisions taken.” In other words, for‐
mal provisions for parliamentary involvement in the
post‐crisis EU governance architecture assume that inter‐
parliamentary cooperation should constitute an account‐
ability enhancing element in the areas of economic and
fiscal policies.
2.1. Theoretical Expectations
In line with the principal‐agent theory applied to study
legislative‐executive relations (inter alia Strøm, 2000),
national parliaments—as principals—should have the
right to demand information from the governments
(as agents), influence their decisions and, if necessary,
impose sanctions. There is also agreement in the liter‐
ature that one of the most important reasons for losing
control over an agent is information asymmetry in favour
of the agent (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991; Lupia, 2003).
As observed by, inter alia, Benz (2001), in the area of
European affairs, there is a much higher level of infor‐
mation asymmetry between the government and the
parliament than in most areas of national policy, which
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significantly limits the ability to exercise supervision and
enforce control. The abovementioned specificity of the
decision‐making within the European Semester and the
privileged position of executive actors makes it even
more difficult for national parliaments to obtain indepen‐
dent information and appropriate expertise to properly
assess the validity of their governments’ policy. Against
this background, the setting up of the IPC SECG was sup‐
posed to compensate for the aforementioned asymme‐
try and loss of parliamentary control over the area of
economic governance and budgetary policy in the EU
(cf. Lupo & Griglio, 2018, p. 364).
While the Rules of Procedure of IPC SECG are not
clear as to how this democratic accountability should be
achieved—whether by providing a joint oversight body
or by enhancing the NP’s and EP’s respective capaci‐
ties to exercise control of their executives—this article
follows the ‘dual scrutiny’ model described by Cooper
(2019) where national parliaments perform their demo‐
cratic function on an individual basis within their respec‐
tive national contexts. It, therefore, assumes that even
if the IPC SECG functions (only) as a ‘discussion forum,’
the exchange of information and best practices within
its remit should help national legislatures carry out their
respective oversight functions vis‐à‐vis their own gov‐
ernments (cf. Cooper, 2019). Taking into account that
Art. 3 of the IPC’s Rules of Procedure states that it
shall convene at least twice a year, in coordination
with the cycle of the European Semester, it is further
expected that parliamentary participation in this IPC
should specifically contribute to better oversight of the
Semester procedures.
Considering that executive accountability vis‐à‐vis
the parliament can be achieved only through appropri‐
ate scrutiny (exercised by information provision) that
ultimately entails parliamentary sanctions on the execu‐
tive (i.e., by use of a parliamentary prerogative to reject
the budget), it is assumed, in line with Fromage (2018,
pp. 14–15), that the exchange of information and best
practices envisaged in the Rules of Procedure should,
in effect, enhance parliamentary control over domestic
executive decisions and activities within the European
Semester. The remainder of this article attempts to verify
whether this is the case.
3. Parliamentary Perceptions of the IPC SECG:
A Cross‐Country Overview
This section presents findings on parliamentary percep‐
tions of the IPC SECG from a questionnaire conducted
by the author among parliamentary chambers of EU
member states between June and July 2019. The survey,
whose general purpose was to address the question of
whether national parliaments are ‘multi‐arena players’
in the EU, included a section related to IPCs. The ques‐
tions inquired about parliaments’ motivations to partic‐
ipate in particular IPCs (including IPC SECG) as well as
about their evaluation of their effectiveness as tools for
enhancing parliamentary scrutiny of and influence on EU
affairs. The survey was sent by email to all 39 EU national
parliamentary chambers (excluding the British Houses of
Parliaments) and generated 25 responses (response rate:
64%). It was addressed by the heads of EU affairs commis‐
sions’ secretariats (Table 1).
Out of the 25 parliamentary chambers that
responded to the survey, the highest number indicated
that the main motivation behind attending the IPC SECG
is the exchange of views and best practices (11) as well
as networking with other national parliaments and/or
representatives of EU institutions (9). Several chambers
also pointed to other motives such as being able to voice
their opinions at the transnational level (2) or the abil‐
ity to build common parliamentary initiatives (2). These
responses resonate with parliamentary feedback pub‐
lished in the 32nd COSAC Biannual report (2019), where
the majority of national chambers also pointed to net‐
working and exchange of views as the main contribution
of inter‐parliamentary cooperation to the good function‐
ing of the EU. In my questionnaire, only one chamber
linked participation in the IPC SECG to the accountability‐
enhancing function. In this context, the Hungarian rep‐
resentative stated that it allows national parliaments
to exercise “oversight rights at the national level with
respect to national governments, and at European level,
with regard to European decision‐making.”
In terms of the effectiveness of this IPC as a platform
through which national parliaments can play a more
meaningful role in EU affairs, nine chambers assessed it
as rather ineffective (Tweede Kaamer; Vouli ton Ellinon;
Eduskunta; Saeima, Assemblée Nationale and Senát,
Table 1. Parliamentary chambers who addressed the questionnaire.
Name of parliamentary chamber
Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat; Belgian Chambre des représentants and Senat; Bulgarian Narodno Sabranie;
Cypriot Vouli ton Antiprosopon; Czech Poslanecká sněmovna and Senat; Danish Folketing; Dutch Eerste and
Tweede Kaamer; Finnish Eduskunta; French Assemblée Nationale and Senat; German Bundesrat; Greek Vouli ton Ellinon,
Hungarian Országgyűlés; Italian Camera dei Deputati and Senato; Latvian Saeima; Polish Sejm and Senat;
Portuguese Assemblea da República, Slovak Narodna Rada and Swedish Riksdag.
Note: The responses are not only representative geographically, but also in terms of the formal parliamentary strength in EU affairs, rep‐
resenting the strong chambers (Folketing, Eduskunta, Tweede Kaamer or Riksdag), moderately strong ones (Sejm, Poslanecká sněmovna
or Assemblée Nationale) as well as weak parliaments (Asembleia da República, Vouli ton Ellinon or Chambre des représentants).
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Poslanecká sněmovna and Senat, Polish Senat). In this
respect, representative of the Assemblée Nationale—
one of the most critical chambers—stated that “the
Conference is not working as it should,” while a repre‐
sentative of Eduskunta stated that “there is no measur‐
able impact of this body on policy, whereas network‐
ing and dialogue may generate invisible benefits.” This
stance could be complemented with the more general
opinion on IPCs as expressed by the Finnish chamber in
the 32nd COSAC questionnaire (2019, Annex, pp. 75–76):
“Conferences [IPCs] offer participants useful support in
their work in their home parliament, but no conference
can replace the work done in parliaments. No parliamen‐
tary conference is in itself capable of providing demo‐
cratic scrutiny or legitimacy.”
In a similar vein, with regard to the potential
oversight function which this IPC could (or should)
enhance, the clerk from the Czech Senat—a chamber rel‐
atively active in EU affairs—observed in a response to
the questionnaire:
In general, the IPC SECG is regarded as an opportu‐
nity to receive and exchange information and opin‐
ions, to seewhat is the general political climate across
Member States and to get to know other partici‐
pants….But the MPs, as well as members of parlia‐
mentary administration, are very sceptical regard‐
ing any legitimizing, scrutinizing, or policy‐influencing
role ascribed to this IPC. As opposed to COSAC, no rel‐
evant collective initiatives are coordinated there.
Similarly, a clerk from Poslanecká sněmovna observed
that: “As there are no official outputs of the Conference
(i.e., conclusions), it serves just as a discussion forum
among MPs, with no political influence.” Three other
chambers also pointed to a lack of written conclusions
as themain weakness of the Conference (Sejm; Vouli ton
Ellinon and Assemblée Nationale).
Although six chambers evaluated the SECG Con‐
ference positively (Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat;
Vouli ton Antiprosopon; Országgyűlés; Italian Senato and
Polish Sejm), only four of them referred to the IPC’s
role in improving the scrutiny of the national execu‐
tive (Senato) or the cycle of the European Semester
(Senato, Országgyűlés and both Austrian chambers).
In this respect, however, the Italian Senato finds all IPCs
to be:
Extremely useful occasions for Senators to meet
and exchange information on EU‐related topics with
their fellow MPs, both from the EP and from other
Member States. Senators become more and more
familiar with political dynamics underlying negotia‐
tions at the EU level. As a result, their cognitive
baggage of participation in the European decision‐
making is enriched… also in the context of parliamen‐
tary control over the executive.
While it is difficult to interpret determinants of par‐
liamentary perceptions without asking additional ques‐
tions, some general observations as to the above findings
can be drawn. It seems that chambers possessing rela‐
tively strong oversight powers in EU affairs are more crit‐
ical of the IPC SECG (i.e., Finnish, Latvian, Dutch or Czech
chambers). This might be caused by the fact that while
they already possess good access to scrutiny documents
and, in some cases, also the possibility to exert influ‐
ence on the policy cycle within the European Semester,
the additional channel of IPC SECG does not bring a sig‐
nificant added value to controlling the process. Having
the ability to exert influence on the policy cycle may
well be a factor, especially in the case of the Latvian
Saeima, the only parliament that can vote on, and pro‐
pose amendments to, the Stability and Convergence
Program (EP, 2014). However, the case of Italian Senato
seems to deviate from this explanation. As described
by Capuano (2017), the chamber is formally involved in
the process of the European Semester both as regards
the scrutiny of Country Specific Recommendations as
well as the National Reform Programs and Stability and
Convergence Programs. Yet, it still appreciates the added
value of IPC SECG as a Europeanizing and policy‐learning
platform for Senators. A factor that might explain this
state of affairs is the Senato’s general support for coop‐
eration with the EP and the belief that the system of
IPCs mutually interconnects national parliaments and
the EP, consequently reinforcing the democratic legiti‐
macy of the European integration process (cf. Capuano,
2017, p. 134). On the contrary, the critical reception by
the French parliament of IPC SECG, might be explained
by its competitive approach to the relations with the EP
combined with over‐ambitious expectations with regard
to endowing this IPC with genuine oversight functions at
this stage of its institutionalization.
These interpretations could be better cross‐checked
and would be rendered more robust if all 25 cham‐
bers who participated in the questionnaire shared
their views on the perceived effectiveness of the SECG
Conference. Unfortunately, in case of 10 chambers
(Austrian andGermanBundesrat, Chambre des représen‐
tants, Narodno Sabranie, Folketing, Eerste Kaamer;
Camera dei Deputati; Asembleia da República, Narodna
Rada; Riksdag), the clerks declined to share their views
seeing the question as either ‘too political’ or by stat‐
ing that there was no official parliamentary position on
the matter.
4. Polish and French Parliamentary Perspectives on the
IPC SECG
In this section, the survey’s findings are complemented
with a more in‐depth comparative case study of the
Polish and French lower chambers’ experience with the
IPC SECG. As well as delving deeper into parliamentary
perceptions, a major objective of this comparison is to
verify whether, in the domestic dimension, participation
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in the IPC SECG in any way enhances the national par‐
liaments’ respective capacities to exercise control of
their executives in the process of European Semester.
Following the ‘dual scrutiny’ model of Cooper (2019) it is
assumed that even if IPC SECG functions (only) as a ‘dis‐
cussion forum’ (as opposed to a ‘joint oversight body’),
the exchange of information and best practices within
its remit should help national legislatures to carry out
their respective oversight functions vis‐à‐vis their gov‐
ernments, as well as enhance parliamentary control over
executive decisions within the European Semester.
The case selection of the Sejm and the Assemblée
Nationale allows this research to account for IPC
SECG‐related experience of a euro and non‐euro area
parliament. In this context, we should expect that par‐
liaments of euro countries are more motivated to scru‐
tinize the Semester as the process has greater implica‐
tions for national budgetary policy (cf. Rasmussen, 2018).
The two chambers also differ regarding their formal insti‐
tutional strength in EU affairs. Winzen (2012) classifies
the French chamber as considerably weaker in terms of
government control (1.17/3) and Karlas (2012) in terms
of influence mechanisms (1.5/3) and their binding char‐
acter (0/3) than the Polish one (2/3, 3/3, and 1.5/3,
respectively). While the French parliament does not pos‐
sess the right to dictate a mandate to a minister in the
EU Council and resolutions issued by parliamentary com‐
missions for EU affairs (EAC) are not formally binding,
the Polish scrutiny model contains elements of a man‐
dating system where an opinion of the Sejm EAC should
form the basis of the government’s position in the EU
(cf. Borońska‐Hryniewiecka, 2020). In line with what was
said above, the weaker position of the French Assemblée
is expected to make the chamber more willing to use
the IPC SECG as leverage to enhance its oversight of
the executive in the sphere of economic governance.
Moreover, it is important to underline that, contrary to
the Polish Sejm, the Assemblée Nationale acts as an
‘expert’ in the European Semester. It invests a great deal
of effort in gathering information and stimulating inter‐
nal debate on this topic by issuing numerous communi‐
cations and reports related to the annual growth survey,
the Country Specific Recommendations, or the European
Commission’s opinion on the national draft budget (cf.
Kreilinger, 2019). Such a stance further boosts the expec‐
tation that participation in the IPC SECGwould be used by
the MPs to increase parliamentary leverage in this area.
The data presented below are a result of a series of
semi‐structured interviews (both direct as well as phone‐
based) with clerks from the French and Polish EAC and
public finances commissions (PFC) conducted between
March 2019 and October 2020, as well as the analyses of
parliamentary minutes.
4.1. Participation and Evaluation
In both countries, it is the EAC—as the main actor in EU
scrutiny—which coordinates parliamentary participation
in the IPC SECG. Judging by MPs attendance, it can be
said that both chambers value the IPC as an important
inter‐parliamentary venue. While the size of delegations
is not defined in the IPC Rules of Procedure, Assemblée
Nationale usually sends the greatest number of teams,
composed of four to five MPs: two from the finance
committee and two or three from the EAC (interview,
March 18, 2019). The Sejm has always sent three MPs
coming from EAC, PFC, and economy and development
commission (EDC)—matching the level of its Belgian and
Dutch counterparts. MPs are usually accompanied by
clerks from the corresponding commissions’ secretariats
(interview, July 19, 2019).
The Assemblée Nationale, as a chamber that played
the protagonist role in lobbying for the establishment
of the IPC SECG, is also one of the most vocal critics
of its functioning. The conducted interviews and analy‐
sis of parliamentary minutes point to several reasons.
The general disappointment with the IPC is that it does
not fulfil the purpose foreseen by its Rules of Procedure,
namely enhancing the democratic accountability of the
EU fiscal governance through proper scrutiny of the
European Semester (interview, March 18, 2019). In this
context, representatives of the Assemblée, including
both the MPs and administrative clerks, complain about
the timing of the IPC, the overly broad scope of its
topics as well as its composition. With regard to the
first two issues, the chairwoman of the EAC, Sabine
Thillaye, postulated during the EAC session in October
2019 that the first‐semestermeeting of the IPC, tradition‐
ally organized within the European Parliamentary Week
at the EP, should be convened at a later date: Between
the publication of the Commission’s Country Specific
Recommendations and their examination by the EU
Council, which takes place in July. In her view, the current
habit of holding the Conference at the beginning of the
year limits the debate to general considerations about
the EU’s economic conditions and growth prospects.
Thillaye also postulated that the second‐semester meet‐
ing organized by the Presidency parliament should be
devoted to an exchange of information on the budgetary
guidelines adopted by Member States in their draft bud‐
getary plans rather than theoretical exchanges on the
economic situation of the EU and the policy pursued
within the Eurozone. Finally, she expressed her dissatis‐
faction with the fact that the IPC does not adopt any
conclusions or recommendations. As regards the IPC’s
composition, Thillaye pointed to the lack of a specific
format for the euro area MPs as one of the main weak‐
nesses (Assemblée Nationale, 2019). In the same vein,
the head of the EAC secretariat regretted that the IPC has
not become a “genuine Eurozone chamber (as originally
proposed by France) but includes MPs from all Member
States” (interview, March 18, 2019).
While the Sejm does not assess the IPC SECG as
harshly as its French counterpart, none of the inter‐
viewed clerks referred to the forum’s role in improving
parliamentary oversight of the national executive, or the
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European Semester in general. When asked about the
main motivations of MPs behind attending the IPC, a
clerk from the PFC who accompanies parliamentary del‐
egations admitted:
MPs usually go because they can. It is more of a
parliamentary tourism rather than essential policy‐
oriented experience. MPs want to get some interna‐
tional overview and go back to their region saying
‘I have just come back from Brussels…’ Yet, if I was to
give you an official answer, the goal of attending SECG
Conference would be information exchange—surely
not improving the government oversight. (Interview,
July 19, 2019)
According to the Polish interviewees, one of the main
weaknesses of the IPC is the already mentioned overly
general level of discussions and unnecessary repetition
of debates on macro‐economic strategies. While this
quite superficial treatment of topics might aim at reduc‐
ing the risk of potential conflicts over salient issueswhich
might emerge among IPC participants, it also prevents
the IPC from becoming a meaningful discussion forum
focused on concrete policy aspects and their oversight
(interview, July 19, 2019). In this regard, during the
January 2019 IPC SECG meeting in Brussels, the chair of
the Economy and Innovation Commission of the Polish
Senat, Andrzej Stanisławek, proposed the setting up of
an inter‐parliamentary working group which would for‐
mulate concrete proposals to reform the IPC in order
to increase its effectiveness (Sejm, 2019a). The Sejm, as
does its French counterpart, views the adoption of writ‐
ten conclusions as a good idea and postulates that a pres‐
idency parliament hosting a meeting should at least pre‐
pare their draft for the IPC’s consideration (interview,
July 9, 2019).
Another major shortcoming of the IPC SECG orga‐
nized in the country holding the rotating presidency is
the lack of simultaneous translation to languages other
than English, French, and possibly that of the host coun‐
try. As observed by a clerk attending this IPC, this leaves
many MPs excluded from the discussions: “Let alone the
oversight function, this technical obstacle results in the
fact that even if MPs vaguely understand the contents of
the speeches they are unable to comment or pose ques‐
tions” (interview, July 19, 2019).
4.2. The Missing Link
When it comes to tracking the linkage between parlia‐
mentary participation in the IPC SECG and the domestic
oversight of the European Semester or EU economic gov‐
ernance in general, the findings reveal a rather grim pic‐
ture in both chambers. In the case of the Sejm, there is
no official follow‐up of these IPC meetings at home and
delegation members—who are theoretically supposed
to act as agents of their entire assembly—donot officially
report back to their committees or the plenary. Short
reports prepared by clerks accompanying MPs at the IPC
are more of a “bureaucratic requirement rather than an
effect of the political interest of MPs” (interview, July 9,
2019). These reports, contrary to MPs communications,
are available only to a narrow group of delegates and the
Speaker of the House, and not publicly accessible online.
In institutional terms, there is no continuity of the
discussion between the IPC SECG and EAC or other com‐
missions’ meetings. The analysis of parliamentary min‐
utes reveals that none of the commissions whose mem‐
bers attend the IPC discuss its agenda either ex ante or
ex post (see e.g., Sejm, 2019b, 2019c). For example, in
April 2019, a joint meeting of the Sejm EAC, PFC and EDC
took place in order to hear the government’s briefing on
the NRP to be submitted to the European Commission.
The session was held around a month after the IPC
SECG’s meeting in Brussels devoted to the assessment
of the European Semester in economic policy coordina‐
tion. During the domestic government debriefing, none
of the three Sejm’s delegates who attended the IPC took
the floor to raise any points or conduct any follow‐up
from the Brussels’ meeting. Strangely enough, MPs who
posed questions to theministers were in fact not the par‐
ticipants of the IPC SECG (Sejm, 2019b, p. 260).
The gathered data also reveal that participation in
the IPC SECG has not influenced in anyway the executive‐
legislative relationship in the area of fiscal and budgetary
governance.While it is difficult to track informal and indi‐
vidual exchanges between MPs and particular ministers,
no official record of any in‐house activity of theMPs who
participated in this IPC is available. Finally, at least in
the Polish case, the findings do not confirm the expecta‐
tion that greater involvement of MPs from sectoral com‐
missions in the IPC SECG increases their Europeanisation
(cf. Kreilinger, 2019). As admitted by parliamentary clerks
from the PFC, there is no observable, increased main‐
streaming of EU‐oriented debates in the commission
as a result of attending the IPC. While joint meetings
with the EAC take place occasionally, no intensified inter‐
institutional cooperation has occurred so far (interview,
July 19, 2019).
In the case of the Assemblée Nationale, ex post
debriefings on the IPC SECG take place from time to
time at EAC meetings. During the current legislature
(2017–2020), oral accounts were presented twice by
Sabine Thillaye, the then chairwoman of the EAC on
October 2019 and February 2020 (during the same leg‐
islature, the EAC held five debriefings on the IPC CFSP).
They consisted of short overviews of the events’ agenda
and some critical reflection. It is worth recalling the lat‐
est one as it illustrates the absence of a genuine impact
of the IPC attendance on parliamentary leverage in pro‐
cess of European Semester. Reporting on its meeting in
Brussels, Thillaye observed:
These meetings are always a little frustrating. Each
person expresses their position in two minutes,
which limits the depth of reflection on such vast
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subjects, and the discussions do not find any concrete
translation likely to allow national parliaments to
influence the governance of Economic andMonetary
Union, which was the stated purpose of the creation
of this conference. (Assemblée Nationale, 2020)
Also, “in a complementary way, a clerk with expe‐
rience at the EAC and finance commission has not
recalled any other substantial, commission—or plenary‐
level, debates in which the contents of IPC SECG were
discussed or used in any substantial way” (interview,
October 29, 2020).
While looking for possible explanations of the ‘miss‐
ing link’ between participation in the IPC SECG and
the enhancement of domestic parliamentary capacity to
hold executives accountable in the process of European
Semester, apart from the inherent procedural weak‐
nesses of the Conference itself, we should also consider
the actual domestic position of parliamentary chambers
in the Semester procedure. There is an important similar‐
ity between the two cases as both the Polish and French
parliaments do not dispose of instruments to meaning‐
fully influence executive decisions within the Semester
cycle. In France, although the government transmits the
draft Stability Program and NRP to the parliament before
they are submitted to the Commission, parliament’s role
in the drafting of both documents is ‘marginal’ (inter‐
view, March 18, 2019). The main actor responsible for
monitoring the procedure is the parliamentary finance
committee where the Stability Program is discussed with
corresponding ministers. MPs admit, however, that their
lack of actual power to influence its contents is ‘glaring’
(Assemblée Nationale, 2015, p. 32). What differentiates
France from Poland in this context, is the French prac‐
tice of making the Stability Program subject to a ple‐
nary debate and a vote. This, however, does not give
MPs a chance to amend the document—making it a
purely formal procedure (interview, October 29, 2020).
Interestingly, the government’s discretion to organize
such a debate provoked political controversy in 2015
when the French government of Francois Hollande, con‐
cerned with insufficient parliamentary support for the
Stability Program, decided not to hold a plenary vote on
it, an act which was met with harsh criticism from MPs.
In the Sejm, the debate on the Convergence Program
and the NRP takes place during joint sessions of the
EAC, the PFC, and the EDC, in the presence of relevant
ministers. While MPs can ask questions and make com‐
ments, these have a similarly symbolic weight. The Sejm
is not asked to present any formal position nor place
any amendments to the documents. Consequently, nei‐
ther the plenary nor the EAC or any other commission,
adopt opinions related to the Semester. As observed by
Schweiger (2021, p. 129), in the context of the European
Semester in Poland: “The government is trying to push
through its agenda without substantial input from MPs.”
Such systemic marginalization of parliamentary voice in
the process of European Semestermight discourageMPs
from making better use of the IPC SECG’s proceedings in
the domestic context.
5. Conclusions
This article aimed to look at the performance of the
IPC SECG from the perspective of domestic legislatures
and verify whether the body enhances their capacity to
better scrutinize and control their executives in the pro‐
cess of European Semester, thus contributing to increas‐
ing the domestic accountability of EU economic gover‐
nance. The data gathered reveal that this is, in fact, not
the case. Only four out of 25 chambers acknowledged
the IPC’s role in improving the oversight of national gov‐
ernment or the Semester cycle, while the rest admit‐
ted that it serves more as a networking forum aimed at
the exchange of views rather than any sort of scrutiny‐
enhancing leverage.
The more in‐depth case studies of Poland and
France reveal that there is hardly any link between IPC
SECG attendance and domestic parliamentary activity
under the Semester. The expectation that the Eurozone
Member States parliament with weaker formal prerog‐
atives in EU affairs would make better use of the IPC
domestically was confirmed only to a small extent, with
regard to the reporting practice. The fact that institu‐
tional aspects of the IPC are at all discussed in the French
EAC differentiates the attitude of Assemblée Nationale
from the Polish parliamentary disinterest.
While the analysis has not accounted for all national
parliaments, and calls for more comparative research,
the presented findings—both with regard to cross‐
country overview as well as the two case studies—do
not seem to fully agree with Kreilinger’s opinion that “if
assessed by the objective set in its Rules of Procedure…
the Conference actually does what it is supposed to do”
(2018, p. 174). While it might perfectly “provide a frame‐
work for debate and exchange of information and best
practices,” it does not meaningfully “contribute to ensur‐
ing democratic accountability in the area of economic
governance and budgetary policy in the EU” (§2.1 Rules
of Procedure). The IPC SECG’s structural and procedural
weaknesses are only one part of the problem. As the
analysis of Polish and French cases has signalled, another
important reason for the lack of a meaningful impact of
the Conference on the parliamentary oversight capacity
might be the marginalized domestic position of parlia‐
ments in the European Semester procedure. In this con‐
text, the 2018 report of the EP concerning the role of
national parliaments in the Semester is telling. Its find‐
ings, based on a parliamentary survey, revealed that
about one‐third of national legislatures are informed
by their own executive about the contents of NRP only
after they have been submitted to the Commission, and
only a few legislative chambers issue an opinion in this
regard. Moreover, many parliaments are not consulted
by their governments beforehand regarding draft bud‐
getary plans presented to the Commission, while some
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are not informed about them at all (Hagelstam et al.,
2018). While these results are alarming in the context
of parliamentary accountability of the EU economic gov‐
ernance, future research should look in more detail at
the actual ways this domestic marginalization of parlia‐
ments affects their participation in the SECG IPC. It would
be especially interesting to analyse these arrangements
in the case of the 26 chambers who consider scrutiny of
budgetary policies and holding governments to account
as high priorities which should be further developed
in the area of inter‐parliamentary cooperation (COSAC,
2019, see responses to question 18 in the Annex).
Such a state of affairs calls for a toning down
of the optimism present in the literature on IPCs,
and more specifically on the IPC SECG, with regard
to assigning them prospective accountability and
oversight‐enhancing functions. It is doubtful whether—
without a qualitative change in domestic governance
arrangements—even after the procedural disagree‐
ments at the IPC level are resolved, the forum will allow
national parliaments and the EP to “embark on jointly
scrutinizing the executive decision‐makers of EU eco‐
nomic governance” (Kreilinger, 2018, p. 274), or whether
the potential adoption of common conclusions by the IPC
SECG could be used as a “joint platform for parliamentary
resolutions or mandates to be addressed to respective
governments” during the main stages of the economic
governance (Lupo & Griglio, 2018, p. 367).
The limited nature of findings presented in this article
also sets avenues for further research aimed at precisely
identifying the interests and preferences of national
parliaments regarding their own roles as accountability
agents in the process of European Semester and the role
that they believe the IPC SECG should perform. Such iden‐
tification would be important also with regard to the
other existing IPCs since—as revealed in the abovemen‐
tioned 32nd COSAC report (2019)—parliamentary expec‐
tations as to the role that inter‐parliamentary coopera‐
tion should play in the EU differ.
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